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[39 C.2d 745; 249 P.2d 17l

[L. A. No. 22050. In Bank. Oct. 21, 1952.]

ARNOI,D h PETERSON et a1., Respondents, v. RUSSELL
F. JOHNSON et a1., Appellants.
[1] Taxation -

[2]

[3]

[4]

)
[5]

[6]

[7]

Equalization of Taxes - Hearing. - Before an ad
valorelll tax becomes final, the taxpayer must be given an
opportunity to have the assessOl·'s valuation reviewed by an
impartial board of equalization or other tribunal. (Const.,
art. XIII, § 9.)
ld.-Equalization of Taxes-Hearing.-After a tax assessment
has been equalized or the taxpayer has failed to avail himself
of the right to an equalization hearing, and the tax levied
against the property has become final, the taxpayer has DO
further right to an equalization hearing.
ld.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-RedemptioD.-If property is
sold to the state after an equalization hearing for nonpayment
of tax, it can be redeemed only on the terms prescribed by
the Legislature, there being no constitutional right of redemption.
ld. - Sale for Delinquent Taxes - Redemption. - Unless a
statute otherwise proyidrs, one 'Who claims a partial interest
in tax-sold property may be required to pay all of the taxes,
penalties and costs to effect a redemption.
ld.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Redemption.-The partial
redemption statute (Pol. Code, § 3818; now Rev. & Tax. Code,
§§ 4146,4155) enables a purchaser of part of property sold to
the state for nonpayment of taxes to redeem that part for less :
than the amount necessary to redeem the whole, but neither .
the purchaser nor the owner of the ta~-sold property may
drmand that the procedure be other than that provided by
the statute.
ld. - Sale for Delinquent Taxes - Redemption. - Under the
partial red~mption statute the valuation of the tax assessor
is final; however the purchaser and owner of the tax-sold
property may contract in advance as to the amount to be paid
by each and thus avoid any uncertainty as to the valuations the
assessor may place on the separate parts.
ld.-Tax Deeds.-Since the proration of taxes between the
property redeemed and the part not redeemed is inherent in

[1] See Cal.Jur., Taxation, § 218 et seq.
[3] See CaI.Jur., Taxation, § 309; Am.Jur., Taxation, § 1097.
McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Taxation, § 200; [3] Taxation,
§ 329; [4-6,8] Taxation, § 337; [7] Taxation, § 349; [9] Taxation,
§ 347; [10] Military, § 2a.
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the whole partial redemption procedure, the area subsequently
deeded to the state and the amount for which it is sold will
necessarily be less than that set forth in the delinquent list, .
and hence the tax deed is not invalid because it does not
correspond to the description and the amount of taxes set
forth in such list.
[8] Id.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Redemption.-Since property
that has been sold to the state by operation of law is assessed
as if no sale had taken place (Pol. Code, § 3813), taxes thereafter levied must be paid to effect a redemption, and they are
also part of the taxes to be apportioned at the time of partial
redemption.
.
[9] Id.-Tax Deeds-Curative Acts.-Such irregularities in tax
proceedings as omission of the dollar sign from the 1931 pub- !
lished delinquent list and stamping the original assessment
roll "redeemed" rather than "part-redeemed" have been validated by the Curative Act of 1943 (Stats. 1943, p. 1993).
.
[10] Military-Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act.-Provisions
of Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act (54 Stats. 1178,
ch. 888) may not be invoked to render invalid a tax sale by
the state where neither the complaining party nor his dependents occupied the property for dwelling, agricultural or
business purposes at the time of his military service.

)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. A. A. Scott, Judge. Affirmed.
Action to quiet title. Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed.
John F. Poole and Alvan M. Palmer for Appellants.
Holbrook & Tarr and W. Sumner Holbrook, Jr., for Respondents.
Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Louis A.
Babior, and Spencer L. Halverson, Deputy City Attorneya,
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants appeal from a judgment
quieting plaintiffs' title to 80 acres of land in Los Angeles
County.
Tbp. land was assessed to Russell F. Johnson in 1931 as an
undivided part of 120 acres owned by him. In July of that
year, he conveyed the entire parcel to his wife, Myrtle N.
Johnson, who failed to pay the taxes as they became due: ?e
delinquent tax list for the year 1931 was published, g'lViJll
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notice that the 120-acre parcel assessed to Russell F. Johnson
would be sold to the state by operation of law unless $380.06
of taxes, penalties, and costs were paid. Neither Mr. nor
Mrs. Johnson paid this amount or any part thereof.
In 1934, Mrs. Johnson conveyed 40 of the 120 acres to
Josephine Palomara, who in turn conveyed them to plaintiff
Peterson. Peterson redeemed the 40 acres under the partial
redemption statute (Pol. Code, § 3818, now Rev. & Tax. Code,
§§ 4146-4155). When Peterson applied for redemption of the
40 acres, the assessor placed a separate valuation on the part
sought to be redeemed for each tax delinquent year. The
remaining acres were valued at the difference between the
original valuation and the valuation placed on the 40 acres.
The taxes were prorated so that each part of the land was
charged with the same amount of taxes that each would have
borne had the assessor made a separate assessment originally.
In ] 937, the state took title to the remaining 80 acres under
a tax deed. The deed described only the 80 unredeemed
acres, and recited that they had been sold to the state in
1932 for $258.06. This figure was the unpaid balance of the
1931 taxes, penalties, and costs that had been prorated to the
80 acres. In May, 1939, Mrs. Johnson died intestate, leaving
her husband and two sons as heirs. Defendant, Warren R.
Johnson, one of thft sons, was in military service from 1942
to 1945. In 1946, the sons assigned their interests in their
mother's estate to their father. In 1945, Peterson and Smith
bought the 80 acres from the state, and in 1947 brought this
action to quiet their title thereto.
The provisions of the partial red emptio. statute (Pol. Code,
§ 3818; now Rev. & Tax. Code, § 4154) require the assessor
to place a valuation on the parcel to be redeemed for the
purpose of prorating the taxes. Defendants contend that the
statute is unconstitutional because it does not provide for an
equalization hearing of the split valuation, and that the court
therefore erred in rejecting defendants' offer to prove that
the valuation placed on the 40 acres was much less than its
true value and that an excessive valuation was therefore
placed on the remaining 80 acres and in sustaining objections
to the introduction of ev1<'If'Dre as to the value of the property
r('deemed.
This rontention confuses the rights of an owner before
a tax upon his propcrt~' becomes final and his rights after
the property has bcen sold to the state for nonpayment of the
tax. [1) Before an ad valorem tax becomes final, the tax-
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payer must be given an opportunity to have the assessor's
valuation reviewed by an impartial board of equalization or
other tribunal. (Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 9; Bandini Estate
Co. v. Los A.ngeles County, 28 Cal.App.2d 224, 230 [82 P.2d
185], and cases cited therein.) [2] After the assessment
has been equalized, or the taxpayer has failed to avail himself of the right to an equalization hearing, and the tax levied
against the property has become final, the taxpayer has no .
further right to an equalization hearing. [3] If the property is thereafter sold to the state for nonpayment of the tax,
it can be redeemed only upon the terms prescribed by the
Legislature. "There is no constitutional right to redeem
property that has been sold to the state for the nonpayment
of taxes. «The right of redemption comes entirely from the
statute, and is subject' to all the limitations and conditions
therein imposed.' (Quinn v. Kenney, 47 Cal. 147, 150.)"
(SllJter-Yuba. Inti. CO. V. Waste, 21 Cal.2d 781, 785 [136 P.2d
11].) [4] Thus, one who claims a partial interest in taxsold property may be required to pay all of the taxes,
penalties, and costs to effect a redemption. (Mayo V. MMshan, 23 Cal. 594, 595.) It is only since 1917 that a purchaser
of part of the property sold to the state for nonpayment of
taxes could redeem that part for less than the amount necessary to redeem the whole.
[5] The partial redemption provisions enable an owner
of tax-sold property to take advantage of a market for part
of the property where none exists for the whole. The purchaser not only gives him the purchase price, but reduces the
amount necessary to be paid by the vendor should he wish
to redeem. Moreov'er, it is the owner of the tax-sold property
who creates the situation in which two persons rather than
. one become interested in redemption. The Legislature has
seen fit to accommodate the parties by a division of the right
to redeem, hut neither party may demand that the procedure
be ot.her than that provided. [6] Under the statute, the valuation of the assessor is final. The parties may, of course, eontract in advance as to th~ amount to be paid by each and
thus avoid any uncertainty as to the valuations the assessor
may place upon the separate parts.
It is true that at one t.ime (1917-1927), the Legislature
provided for valuation by the anditor and prescribed a proC'cdurl' for filin~ and h!'aring prot!'sts regarding the proposed
diyisiflll. As amended in 1927, the statut.e requires the auditor
to secn!'!' the valuation from the assessor and omits the pro-

I

Oct. 1952]

)

)

PETERSON lI. JOHNSON
[39 C.2d '145; 249 P.2d 171

749

test procedure. 'l'he Legislature apparently concluded that
the assessor, who made the original valuation, could arrive
at thJ! correct division thereof without the necessity of further proceedings that would delay partial redemption.
[7] Defendants also contend that the tax proceedings
were void, on the ground that the description and the amount
of taxes set forth in the 1931 delinquent tax list do not correspond to those in the 1937 tax deed to the state. Defendants
do 110t deny that the tax list correctly sets forth the amount
of taxes, penalties, and costs owed the state or that the state
had· the power to declare the entire 120 acres sold for that
amount. The proration of taxes between the property redeemed and the part not redeemed is inherent in the whole
partial redemption procedure. At the time of the tax deed to
the state in 1937, the 40 acres had been redeemed by Peterson.
Since taxes remained unpaid only on the 80 acres, only 80
acres could be deeded to the state. Thus, after a partial redemption, the area subsequently deeded to the state and the
amount for which it is sold will necessarily be less than that
set forth in the delinquent list.
Defendants contend that the proceedings after partial
redemption were void on the ground that the assessor placed
separate valuations on the 40 acres for each tax-delinquent
year. Section 3818 of the Political Code at the time of the
partial redemption provided that the auditor was to submit
a description of the property sought to be redeemed to the
assessor, "who must place a valuation thereon." The auditor
was then to estimate the amount of taxes due thereon. Defendants interpret this language as authorizing the assessor
to place only one valuation on the part to be redeemed and not
a separate valuation for each year.
[8] Property that has been sold to the state by operation
of law is assessed as if no sale had taken place. (Pol. Code,
§ 3813.) Taxes thereafter levied must be paid in order to
effect a redemption. (Pol. Code, § 3817.) They are also part
of the taxes to be apportioned at the time of partial redemption. Since property values may fluctuate from year to
year, the valuation upon which the apportionment is based
must reflect such changes. To accomplish the purpose of the
foregoing statutes, it was therefore necessary for the assessor
to place a separate valuation 011 the property for each year.
Section 4154 of the Revenue and Taxation Code makes this
clear by providing: I ' The assessor shall immediately place a
separate valuation on the parcel for each year in which it was

!
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delinquent and not separately valued. . . . " (See Rev. & Tax.
Code, § 2~)
[9] Defendants also contend that the tax proceedings
were invalid, on the grounds that the dollar sign was omitted I
from the 1931 published delinquent list and that the original I
assessment roll had been stamped "redeemed" rather than
"part-redeemed." These irregularities have long since been
validated by the curative act of 1943 (Stats. 1943, p. 1993). i
(Wall v. M. «7 R. Sheep Co., 33 Ca1.2d 768 [205 P.2d 14].)
[10] Defendants contend finally that the provisions of the
Soldiers and Sailors Civil Relief Act render the sale by the .
state of the 80 acres invalid. Warren R. Johnson was in the
military service at the time of this sale in February, 1945.
That act is applicable only to real property owned and occupied for dwelling, agricultural, or business purposes by a ,
person in military service. (McCaslin v. Hamblen, 37 Cal.2d !
196, 202 [231 P.2d 1].) Warren R. Johnson testified that'
neither he nor his dependents occupied the property for any •
of the specified purposes at the time of his military service.
Thus, by virtue of its express provisions, the act is inappli.
cable here.
Judgment affirmed.

I

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.

